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THE CONCERTO WITHOUT THE SHEET MUSIC: REVISITING THE




A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
determined in 2003 that reporters fighting a subpoena for their tapes of in-
terviews with a source had no First Amendment or common law right to
refuse to cooperate with the Department of Justice.' The source's identity
was known, and he was a key prosecution witness against a man accused of
terrorist activities in Northern Ireland.2 Also, the source had expressed no
misgivings about having the tapes turned over to the defense.3
Judge Richard Posner, writing for the unanimous three-judge panel,
expressed bewilderment at the reporters' resistance to the subpoena. Judge
Posner, a prolific writer who had just published a book extolling the virtues
of judicial pragmatism,4 appeared to have a pragmatic problem with the re-
porters' position. Judge Posner stated that if the source was willing to have
tapes of his conversations released to the defense while the reporters were
not willing to release them, then each one's position in regard to the First
Amendment was reversed.5 It seemed that the source was more willing to
release information to the public than the reporters, and was providing in-
formation to the public not the purpose of First Amendment press protec-
tion?6
Judge Posner's puzzlement reflects a long-standing debate over the
breadth of the First Amendment's protection of free speech and a free press.
Indirectly, the same debate is at the heart of more recent attempts by report-
ers to shield information from disclosure to grand juries and courts.7 The
* Assistant Professor, School of Journalism, Indiana University. B.A., Morehead State
University; M.A., Ph.D., University of Florida. The author wishes to thank Amy Reynolds
for her insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article and Debbie Goh for her research
assistance.
1. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
2. Id. at 531.
3. Id. at 533.
4. See generally RiCHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003).
5. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533.
6. Id.
7. See Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh'g en banc denied, 428
F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir.
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debate can be summed up in the following way: To what extent, if any, does
the First Amendment protect the right of the press and/or the public to
gather information? Put another way, does protection for free expression
imply a need to protect the process of making that expression better in-
formed?
This article will examine this question in the context of whether jour-
nalists should have a First Amendment right to refuse to disclose the names
of confidential sources. First, however, it is necessary to understand why the
question has no easy answer. The article will begin, therefore, by examining
the original intent of those who wrote the First Amendment. 8 Next, the arti-
cle will examine the various major theories about the First Amendment's
speech and press clauses that have arisen to fill the void left by a lack of
direct evidence about original intent.9 The article will then analyze the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence in regard to free expression and information
gathering, particularly the cases that have tried to define the limits of the
press clause.' ° Finally, the article will deal more specifically with the diffi-
culty of locating a right to protect news source identities in the First
Amendment and the implications of that difficulty."
II. THE LIMITS OF ORIGINAL INTENT ANALYSIS
As Professor Rodney Smolla has said, determining what the writers of
the First Amendment intended can be "a laborious and frustrating experi-
ence." 2 Smolla traces the problem to three conditions, which can be
summed up in the following way: Many different people with different per-
spectives worked on the Bill of Rights at a time of great intellectual ferment,
and sometimes those people's actions did not match their words."
Professor Smolla's logic is hard to escape because it could be applied
to virtually any human endeavor that has produced fundamental shifts in
politics, science, the arts, or industry. Even if we could determine what the
Framers intended, historian Leonard Levy argues that relying on original
intent to interpret the Constitution "is unrealistic beyond belief."' 4 To inter-
pret the Constitution by asking, in effect, "What would the Framers do?"
2005), cert. denied sub nom., Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005) (along with
Cooper v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005)); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st
Cir. 2004).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 28 (1992).
13. Id.
14. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORoGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 322 (1988).
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requires modem courts to consider the text in the light of a context that ex-
isted in the late eighteenth century, Levy argues. 5 Justice Stephen Breyer
offers a view that synthesizes the points made by Smolla and Levy. Justice
Breyer argues that we cannot question the Framers about their intent, and
even if we could, we likely would not get a clear answer. 6 He finds it
unlikely that people who could not even agree on whether there should be a
Bill of Rights would agree about how to interpret it over the centuries. 7
Of course, there are those who believe that original intent analysis is
not only possible but necessary." But even some advocates of original intent
analysis admit that First Amendment jurisprudence raises special difficul-
ties, especially in light of the vast changes in communication technology
since the Constitution was written. 9
The lack of specific instructions from the Founders about what they
meant on those rare occasions when they went "on the record" about the
need to protect speech and press freedom2 should give us pause. But origi-
nal intent analysis can be useful in setting a baseline for what should be pro-
tected, from what, and for what purpose. What becomes clear by even a
cursory examination, such as the one that follows, of the spotty records left
by leaders of the Revolution and the early days of the republic is that free
speech and a free press were viewed as essential for a self-governing people
for two reasons: to foster what Melville Nimmer would call a "democratic
dialogue"'" and to aid the people in "checking" the abuses of government, to
borrow a word from Vincent Blasi.22
The two purposes of free expression were evident in one of the first of-
ficial publications from the people who would help form the United States.
In 1774, two years before the Declaration of Independence, the Continental
Congress sent a letter to Canadian citizens to explain the purpose of the
15. Id.
16. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
117 (2005).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1976); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997).
19. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 18, at 45.
20. In the interest of brevity, the discussion below will dwell only on statements pro-
duced with some sort of governmental or quasi-government imprimatur. For a much more
detailed analysis of relevant statements about free expression by prominent people in the
Revolution and post-Revolution eras, see LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS
(1985) [hereinafter LEVY, EMERGENCE].
21. Melville B. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to
Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 653 (1975).
22. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977).
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revolution against English rule. 23 The letter said that the revolution was nec-
essary to protect certain rights of free men, among them freedom of the
press.24 The revolutionaries explained that a free press was necessary for
"the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general" and for its
"diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government.,
25
Also, the Continental Congress said a free press allows citizens to share
their thoughts and fosters unity among them.26 The citizens could use the
press to unite in order to shame oppressive leaders "into more honourable
and just modes of conducting affairs.
27
But if a free press was so essential to foster unity and check govern-
ment oppression, why was it not protected in specific language in the body
of the Constitution? True, many of the state constitutions, adopted after in-
dependence was declared but before the federal constitution was ratified,
contained statements of support for freedom of the press.28 But as historian
Jack Rakove has noted, many of the provisions in the first state constitutions
or bills of rights were phrased as if they were advisory rather than prohibi-
tory.29 Rakove suggests that the idea that a constitution could be a supreme
law of the land had not sunk in yet, and at any rate, the early constitution
writers were more concerned about limiting the executive branch than the
legislative, and, therefore, they saved their prohibitions for that branch.3"
23. Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec, in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY





28. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXI ("Freedom of the press and trial by jury to
remain inviolate forever"), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 785 (Francis
Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter Thorpe]; MD. DEC. OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XXXVIII
("That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved"), reprinted in 3 Thorpe,
supra, at 1690; MASS. CONST. art. XVI (1780) ("The liberty of the press is essential to the
security of freedom in a state; it ought not, therefore, to be restricted in this commonwealth"),
reprinted in 3 Thorpe, supra, at 1892; N.H. CONST. of 1792 art. XXII ("The Liberty of the
Press is essential to the security of freedom in a state; it ought, therefore, to be inviolably
preserved"), reprinted in 4 Thorpe, supra, at 2456; PA. DEC. OF RIGHTS of 1776 art. I, § 35
("The printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceed-
ings of the legislature, or any part of government"), reprinted in 5 Thorpe, supra, at 3090;
VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 12 ("That the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks
of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic government"), reprinted in 7 Thorpe,
supra, at 3814.
29. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 307-08 (1996); see also supra note 28 (citing language from early state con-
stitutions and bills of rights).
30. RAKOVE, supra note 29, at 307-08.
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Some of this grappling with what a constitution could or should do may
explain why the proposed federal constitution contained no bill of rights,
including no specific limitation on the power of any branch of government
in regard to free expression. In defending the Constitution from criticism
that it did not contain explicit protection for individual rights, Alexander
Hamilton replied that the entire Constitution was a bill of rights.3 Because
the government had no power unless it was expressly granted to the gov-
ernment, Hamilton wrote, the people retained all rights that the government
did not possess.32 In regard to press freedom, Hamilton said that he could
not imagine a way to craft a definition of "liberty of the press" that could not
be evaded.33 Freedom of the press, he said, depended not upon a written
prohibition on government, but on public opinion and "the spirit of the peo-
ple and of the government.,
34
Critics of the Constitution, fearing that it was creating a central gov-
ernment that would be too powerful, continued to insist that a bill of rights
be added.35 Two powerful states, Virginia and New York, called for a sec-
ond constitutional convention to make changes if a declaration of rights was
not adopted.36 James Madison, one of the authors of the Constitution and the
Federalist Papers, made it one of his priorities after being elected to the first
Congress to draft and send to the states for ratification what became known
as the Bill of Rights.37 And the rest, as they say, is history.
But the adoption of the First Amendment,38 with Virginia's ratification
vote in December 1791, along with nine of the other eleven amendments
sent to the states, 39 did not settle the question of what "the freedom of
speech, or of the press" '40 meant. Leonard Levy has argued, rather persua-
sively,4' that as a legal term, "freedom of the press" meant only what it
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
32. Id. at 476-77.
33. Id. at 476.
34. Id. at 476-77.
35. CRAIG R. SMITH & ScoTr LYBARGER, THE RATIFICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
1789-91, at 34-40 (1991).
36. Id.
37. HELEN E. VEIT ET AL., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 12 (1991) (citing Madison
Resolution of June 8, 1789, reprinted in N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 12, 1789).
38. In its final form, the First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." UNITED STATES CONST. amend. I.
39. SMITH & LYBARGER, supra note 35, at 96. What we know as the First Amendment
was originally the third, but the first two proposed amendments, dealing with congressional
pay and representation, were defeated. Id.
40. UNITED STATES CONST. amend. I.
41. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 20. But see William T. Mayton, From a Legacy of
Suppression to the "Metaphor of the Fourth Estate, " 39 STAN. L. REV. 139 (1986) (arguing
2006]
UALR LAW REVIEW
meant in English common law, which was defined by William Blackstone in
the 1760s in his Commentaries on the Laws of England.4 2 Blackstone,
speaking in the context of describing criminal and civil libel, said that lib-
erty of the press "consists in laying no previous restraints upon publica-
tions," but not protecting publishers from punishment for what they wrote.43
It would destroy freedom of the press to stop someone from publishing,
Blackstone wrote, but if that person "publishes what is improper, mischie-
vous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity." Black-
stone suggested that curbing the abuse of the press was the only way to save
it from prior restraints.45 If it is shown that the abuses will be punished, this
will sap the energy from the argument that the only way to curb abuses of
the press is to restrain what is published.46 However crabbed Blackstone's
view of free expression must seem to those of us living in the twenty-first
century, it would have been nearly radical to his country's leaders only a
few generations before he wrote it. Press censorship was common in Eng-
land until the late 1600s and consisted of government and church licensing
and prior approval requirements."
Blackstone's description of the limits of press freedom went further,
however, and it is here that we find a break between English common law
and American law. According to Blackstone, the publication of "blasphe-
mous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous" libels4"
could be punished through criminal or civil actions.49 While falsehood must
be proved in a civil action, that was not the case in regard to criminal libel.50
The tendency of "malicious defamations" about anyone, but particularly a
public official, was to "provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public ha-
tred, contempt, and ridicule."'" Such defamatory material had the natural
tendency to provoke people to revenge, thus disturbing the public peace.
52
that Levy misinterpreted history and that the Framers had a broader understanding of press
freedom than the Blackstonian view).
42. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (4 vols.) (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press facsimile 1979) (1765-69) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE].
43. 4 id. at 151.
44. Id. at 151-52.
45. Id. at 153.
46. Id. at 152-53.
47. See generally FRED S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776
(1952).
48. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 151.






Whether the material was true or false was immaterial in such circum-
stances, Blackstone said.53
But when the First Amendment faced its first major test with the pas-
sage of the Sedition Act of 1798,"4 which made it a crime to publicly criti-
cize the president, Congress, or the government generally, the Act allowed
persons charged under it to plead truth as a defense.55 Although the idea that
government could punish people for criticizing officials or the government
itself is pure Blackstone, truth as a defense is not, and neither is a provision
in the Sedition Act that allowed juries in seditious libel actions to determine
the truth of the published material and whether it was indeed libelous.56
These American touches on the law appear to owe their existence to the
John Peter Zenger case.57 Zenger, a newspaper editor prosecuted for libel for
publishing articles critical of the New York colonial governor in the 1730s,
was acquitted after his attorney, Andrew Hamilton, argued that the jury
should be allowed to decide the truth of the articles and whether they were
libelous.5 8 At the time, English law allowed juries to consider only whether
the accused had published the offending document; all other matters were
the province of the court.59 Although Levy has pointed out that the Zenger
acquittal was a rare exception to the general rule that people accused of
criminal libel were convicted, Levy also has noted that the Zenger story was
widely distributed in the colonies.'
The Sedition Act was directed primarily at Thomas Jefferson, James
Madison, and others who had formed an opposition party, the Republicans,
which challenged the Federalists, led by President John Adams and Alexan-
der Hamilton.6' Jefferson and Madison persuaded the legislatures of Ken-
tucky and Virginia, respectively, to approve resolutions they had drafted
condemning the Sedition Act.62 Madison's Virginia Resolution criticized the
Sedition Act for exercising a power that the First Amendment "expressly
and positively" forbade. 3 Madison said the passage of the Act should alarm
53. Id.
54. 1 Stat. 596-97 (1798).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF
JOHN PETER ZENGER (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997) (1736).
58. Id. at 163.
59. Id. at 46.
60. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 20, at 37.
61. See JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETrERS 10-11 (1956).
62. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 4 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jonathon
Elliot ed., 2d ed., J.P. Lippincott 1888, reprint 1941) [hereinafter Elliot's Debates]; Thomas
Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 Elliot's Debates, supra.
63. Madison, supra note 62, at 528.
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citizens because the Act interfered with the rights of the people to freely
examine "public characters and measures," a right that was crucial to guard
all other rights.' 4 Jefferson's Kentucky Resolution focused primarily on at-
tacking the Sedition Act as an encroachment on states' rights.65
The Sedition Act expired in 1801 at around the same time that Jeffer-
son was being inaugurated as the third president of the United States, and
for a long time, it seemed that the debate over free expression died with it, at
least at the federal level.
We are left with contradictions when we examine the early history of
free expression in the United States, but it is interesting to note that both the
1774 letter to Quebec and the 1798 and 1799 resolutions of Madison and
Jefferson suggest that a key to protecting free expression was its service to a
self-governing people in keeping watch over government and safeguarding
their other rights."6 The tying of the press to politics should not surprise us.
Levy has noted that the press was much freer in practice than it was under
the law in the early days of the American republic.67 This is likely because
newspapers of the time were primarily party organs, not, for the most part,
independent purveyors of objective news.68 This may explain why, accord-
ing to a recent book by historian Paul Staff, the media in the United States
have developed as they have primarily because of political decisions since
Colonial times.69
None of this helps us answer the basic question of whether the press
and public should have rights to gather information as well as engage in free
expression. The original intent debate is more useful in describing the limits
of the word "freedom" than what the Framers meant by "speech" and
"press." But, attempting to answer the original intent question helps get us
started down that path because it provides a necessary starting place for dis-
cussing the ferment of First Amendment theory and practice in the twentieth
century.
III. THE LIMITS OF FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
It would be inaccurate to say that all debate on the First Amendment's
meaning stopped when the Sedition Act died. With few exceptions, how-
ever, most of the debate shifted to the states, where courts were actively
64. Id. at 529.
65. Jefferson, supra note 62, at 540-44.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27 and 62-65.
67. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 20, at xii-xv.
68. See generally SIDNEY KOBRE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIAL NEWSPAPER
(1960).




involved in adjudicating cases involving expression, while the Supreme
Court remained largely silent.70
The general silence from the Supreme Court throughout the nineteenth
century and into the twentieth century was matched by a similar quietude in
the academy and the legal profession. Those who did ponder the meaning of
speech and press freedom came to no consensus in the early years of the
nineteenth century, but those early musings did produce one commentary, at
least, suggesting that press and speech rights were different. St. George
Tucker's challenge to the Blackstone definition of a free press was pub-
lished in an American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries edited by
Tucker.7 In an appendix, Tucker disputed that Blackstone's "no prior re-
straint" definition of a free press was the law of the United States.72 Tucker
also argued that the press needed more protection from government regula-
tion than speech. 73 Even the best speaker could be heard only by a few peo-
ple unless his sentiments were preserved and distributed by the press,
Tucker wrote.74 For that reason, the press must be as "unlimited as the hu-
man mind: viewing all things, penetrating the recesses of the human heart,
unfolding the motives of human actions," all in search of the truth.75
Tucker's comments sound like a version of marketplace theory. The
belief that all ideas (or most) should be able to compete for attention in a
free society has origins in John Milton's 1644 essay, Areopagitica,76 and
John Stuart Mill's writing more than 200 years later.77 In the United States,
marketplace theory owes its emergence as a potent free-expression mecha-
nism to Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Justice Holmes, in
Abrams v. United States,78 wrote the dissenting opinion for himself and Jus-
tice Louis Brandeis when the Court upheld the convictions of five persons
under the Espionage Act79 for distributing leaflets urging weapons plant
workers to leave their jobs so their weapons could not eventually be used
70. See Margaret A. Blanchard, Filling in the Void: Speech and Press in State Courts
Prior to Gitlow, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED (Bill F. Chamberlin & Charlene J.
Brown eds., 1982); TIMOTHY GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT (1991); DAVID M.
RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997).
71. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Note G, at 17





76. John Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in AREOPAGITICA AND OTHER POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF JOHN MILTON (Foundation Press ed., 1999).
77. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Alburey Castell ed., 1947) (1859).
78. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
79. 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
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against the Bolshevik revolutionaries in Russia.80 A bit sarcastically, Justice
Holmes suggested that prosecuting people for having unpopular political
beliefs was "perfectly logical" if one believed their opinions were false and
one had the power to "sweep away all opposition."'" But he wrote that the
best test of ideas was "the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market. 8 2 Because the truth of any idea could not be
determined with certainty, Justice Holmes wrote, "I think we should be eter-
nally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless" the expression of those
ideas would create an imminent danger of some magnitude.83
Justice Holmes's conception of free speech envisioned a laissez-faire
marketplace of ideas in which all ideas could be aired, and the most popular
ones would "win," no matter what they might be or to what end they might
lead. As he suggested in his dissent in 1925's Gitlow v. New York,84 he was
willing to accept that political majorities might form that would seek to end
democratic government.85 By contrast, Justice Brandeis's conception of the
marketplace of ideas was more idealistic in its faith in the power of reason.
In his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,86 Justice Brandeis ques-
tioned the premises of California's criminal syndicalism law and the major-
ity opinion, while agreeing that there was sufficient evidence that Anita
Whitney had violated it.87 He argued that the Framers believed in liberty
"both as an end and as a means." 88 They knew that repression bred hatred
and instability, and they put their faith in the idea that the best way to com-
bat "evil counsels" was with "good ones," or, as he put it later in the opin-
ion, the remedy for "falsehood and fallacies" was "more speech, not en-
forced silence., 89 He said that when reason had a chance to prevail there was
no imminent danger to the country in unpopular ideas, and no restriction of
speech was warranted.9"
Although Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis had somewhat different
conceptions of the marketplace of ideas, both tied its function squarely to
the political life of the country. Similarly, some thirty years after Justice
Holmes's Abrams dissent, Alexander Meiklejohn tied the value of free
speech directly to what might be called practical liberty. Professor Meik-
80. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616.
81. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
85. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
86. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
87. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 375, 377.
90. Id. at 377.
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lejohn argued that the First Amendment's value lay in protecting the rights
of voters to gain wisdom so that they could make sound decisions.9' Meik-
lejohn's conception of free expression as a necessary ingredient in self-
government did not include an individual right to speak anytime, any-
where.92 But, Meiklejohn said that no one should be barred from speaking
on issues of public concern because of the content of his or her speech.93
The advocacy of a particular idea could not be barred because "someone in
control [thought] it unwise, unfair, [or] un-American., 94 Although an indi-
vidual might be barred from speaking to avoid redundancy, to keep order, or
to allow other sides to be heard, no individual could be declared "'out of
order' because we disagree with what he intends to say," Meiklejohn
wrote.
95
Both the marketplace of ideas and self-government theories of free ex-
pression emphasize the utility of speech in democratic dialogue. But, in a
later work, Meiklejohn also suggested that freedom of speech and of the
press, along with the freedom of assembly and petition, served to help citi-
zens operate as a fourth branch of government that could check the power of
the other three.96 The executive, legislative, and judicial branches were for-
bidden to interfere with the people's exercise of their "fourth branch" pow-
ers through voting and the exercise of the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.97
This conception that either the public generally or the press specifically
acts as a fourth branch of government, or Fourth Estate, arises in a number
of theoretical constructs. One of the leading advocates in the late twentieth
century for a Fourth Estate model of the press was Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart. Shortly after President Nixon resigned in the wake of the
Watergate scandal, Justice Stewart said, in a speech, that the press had per-
formed exactly the function the Framers intended when it exposed criminal
activity in the White House.98 Stewart said that the Framers recognized a
distinction between individual speech and institutional press rights and did
not intend for them to mean the same thing.99 The Framers wanted the press
to serve as a check on the activities of the three official branches of govern-
ment, he said.'00 But at the same time, the Framers did not guarantee the
91. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
26-27 (1948).
92. Id. at 24-26.
93. Id. at 26.
94, Id.
95. Id
96. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 96 (1960).
97, Id.
98. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
99. Id. at 633-34.
100. Id. at 634.
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press access to government information or protection for news sources. Jus-
tice Stewart said the Framers set up the contest between government and the
press but did not decide the outcome. 1 The First Amendment was "neither
a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act."'
02
A few years later, law professor Vincent Blasi picked up where Justice
Stewart left off, arguing at length that the Framers clearly intended for the
First Amendment to empower citizens to serve as a check on government.
10 3
Blasi did not single out the press as the Fourth Estate, however, and instead
came to the same conclusion as Meiklejohn, that all citizens had a part in
keeping an eye on the leaders they elected.1"4 Blasi based his conclusions on
a reading of historical documents from both pre- and post-Revolution writ-
ers who, he said, were speaking of the First Amendment's checking value
when they spoke of free expression as a defense against tyranny.0 5
Although Blasi did not suggest that the First Amendment singled out
the press for special protection not available to all citizens, he did suggest
that the press was "the institution best suited" to arouse opposition among
the populous to official misconduct.' 6 To protect the press's ability to ferret
out information that would allow it to sound the alarm about official mis-
conduct, Blasi recommended that the press be afforded an unqualified privi-
lege to protect relationships between journalists and government-employee
sources and a minimally qualified privilege protecting other reporter-source
relationships."'
In addition to the marketplace of ideas, self-government, and checking-
value theories of the First Amendment, there are many others. Thomas Em-
erson, for example, developed the idea in the 1960s that there is a "system"
of free expression that protects individuals' personal autonomies, their par-
ticipation in self-government, their ability to maintain a stable and adaptable
community, and their search for knowledge and truth.10 8 Later, an Emerson
student, C. Edwin Baker, developed the "liberty theory" of free expression,
focusing on two aspects of speech: personal self-fulfillment and participa-
tion in societal decision-making."° Baker argued that speech had little value
unless it was the product of an autonomous individual's beliefs."0 But, de-
spite his emphasis on individual autonomy and self-fulfillment, Baker also
101. Id. at 636.
102. Id.
103. Blasi, supra note 22.
104. Id. at 527.
105. Id. at 529-38.
106. Id. at 605.
107. Id. at 606-07.
108. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSIoN 6-7 (1970).





said he believed that the First Amendment must protect participation in self-
government because a person's participation in group decision-making in-
fluences both her identity and her opportunities."'
Although this is not an exhaustive list of all First Amendment theories
and their components, it is enough of a survey to convey the general idea
that most theories about the value of protecting free expression focus to
some extent on the speaker's relationship to government. The marketplace
of ideas and self-government theories make political life the central focus of
free expression. So does the checking-value theory. Even theories that focus
on the rights of autonomous individuals to attain self-fulfillment through
expression note that participating in self-government is one way to achieve
that goal.
The various theories that have emerged to explain the importance of
free speech and a free press all have certain flaws. Marketplace theory can
be challenged both for its reliance on a search for truth, which may be un-
discoverable, and for its reliance on an imperfect commercial marketplace
that gives those with power and money more of a voice than others." 2 Meik-
lejohn's laser-like focus on self-government can be seen as too narrow and
too closely tied to one particular, idealized version of self-government." 3
The "Fourth Estate" model has been criticized as creating a contradiction by
suggesting that the press is both outside government as a watchdog and at
the same time is a part of government." 4 Professor Ronald Cass has sug-
gested that all of the theories are partly right, but all suffer from the same
flaw: an emphasis on positive goals rather than on the First Amendment's
"negative" command that government should keep its hands off speech and
the press." 5
First Amendment theory, for the most part, does not help us find a spe-
cial place in the Constitution for the press or for gathering information. Jus-
tice Stewart aside, most First Amendment scholars do not see the institu-
tional press as a specially protected institution called the Fourth Estate. Only
Vincent Blasi suggests that the checking value of the First Amendment re-
quires a journalist's privilege and other protections for newsgathering, as
well as publishing. As the next section will demonstrate, those who believe
the press is a specially protected institution in the First Amendment also will
not find much comfort in Supreme Court decisions.
111. Id. at 992.
112. See generally Stanley lngber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984
DuKE L.J. 1(1984).
113. See Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation
and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1419 (1987).
114. See JOHN C. MERRILL, THE IMPERATIVE OF FREEDOM: A PHILOSOPHY OF
JouRNALIsTIcAuToNoMY 116-17 (1974).
115. Cass, supra note 113, at 1422.
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IV. THE LIMITS OF FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The question of whether the institutional press has any First Amend-
ment rights above and beyond the rights shared by all people presupposes
that the press is an institution. But, it is arguable whether the press was insti-
tutional in nature, in the sense that it had shared aspirations, professional
practices, and commercial structures, until the late nineteenth or early twen-
tieth century. The press's growing independence from political parties, its
business structure, the creation of college curricula in journalism, and the
formation of professional organizations predated the Supreme Court's inter-
est in First Amendment issues. 116 But, the rise of an institutional press did
not coincide with a rise in special protection for the news media.
A. The Supreme Court Focuses on Free Expression
In regard to this discussion, 1938 was an important year. In that year,
the famous Footnote 4 in Carolene Products Co. v. United States. 7 estab-
lished, unceremoniously, a shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence." 8 Histo-
rian Bruce Ackerman has noted that the Court had repeatedly struck down
President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal legislation because the justices
saw it as interfering with economic rights of both workers and employers." 9
But, after President Roosevelt threatened to "pack" the Court with new
members by increasing its size to fifteen justices, the Court, rather abruptly,
changed gears and began to uphold New Deal legislation in 1937.120
Carolene Products, which involved regulations on the interstate commerce
in milk adulterated with oils other than milk fat, continued that transforma-
tion of the Court, as Ackerman would put it, by noting that in the future, all
economic regulation would be upheld as long as it had a rational basis.'2 '
But, in the footnote, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone said that the Court would
now turn greater attention to protecting people's rights to participate in poli-
tics, including the right to be free of restraints on "the dissemination of in-
formation."' 22 As some writers have noted, Justice Stone's footnote, quietly
116. See, e.g., GERALD BALDASTY, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEWS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 82 (1992) (noting rise of separate departments for news and business
operations in newspapers in the late nineteenth century); FRANK LUTHER MoTT, AMERICAN
JOURNALISM 489 (1962) (noting first journalism programs in universities began in late
1800s); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS 60 (1978) (suggesting that the press
did not become an "occupational group or industry" until the late 1800s).
117. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
118. Id. at 152 n.4.
119. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 317-18 (1998).
120. Id. at 362-63.
121. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152.
122. Id. at 152 n.4.
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tucked away in a case about milk-product regulation, signaled that the Court
would turn its attention from directly curtailing economic regulation to pro-
tecting citizens' rights to do the same thing through their rights of free
speech, a free press, assembly, petition, and voting. 123
In the same year, the Supreme Court began to think about how to put
renewed vigor into free expression; the Court also set a precedent regarding
freedom of the press that has endured to this day. In Lovell v. Griffin, 24 the
Court struck down a Georgia town ordinance that required people distribut-
ing leaflets or pamphlets door-to-door to get permits from the city.125 The
Court's unanimous opinion concluded that the ordinance was a prior re-
straint because it amounted to a licensing scheme that clearly violated the
press clause:
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It
necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been
historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas
Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press in its
historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication [that] affords
a vehicle of information and opinion.' 
26
Earlier, the Court had said that the First Amendment did not give the
press any special exemptions from business regulations applicable to all
businesses. 27 The Court's determination to hold the press to the same First
Amendment standards as the public also had worked in the press's favor,
however, most notably in protecting a newspaper from a prior restraint,
28
protecting the press from discriminatory taxation,'29 and preventing newspa-
123. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 313 (1989); PAUL L. MURPHY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 180-81 (1972).
124. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
125. Id. at 451.
126. Id. at 452.
127. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (holding that wire ser-
vice's newsgathering business did not exempt it from being held accountable for unfair labor
practices); Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (upholding unfair labor
practice finding against news service for copying wire stories published by another service
without payment or attribution); Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 289 (1913) (uphold-
ing Postal Service requirement that publications receiving second-class rate publish names of
editors, managing editors, publishers, and owners and label advertising).
128. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (striking down Minnesota law that
allowed state to shut down "nuisance" newspapers and required owners to get government
permission to publish again).
129. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) (striking down Louisiana




pers from being punished for publishing income-tax information available to
the general public. 3
In the nearly seventy years since Carolene Products and Lovell were
decided, the threads of both cases have continued to run virtually unbroken
through First Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court began to pro-
vide more breathing space for free expression. As late as 1907, it was appar-
ent that the Blackstonian definition of a free press--one that faced no prior
restraints but could be punished for what it published-was still popular. In
that year, Justice Holmes's majority opinion in Patterson v. Colorado'
cited Blackstone 132 in upholding a contempt citation to an editor whose pa-
per ran articles and cartoons criticizing the Colorado Supreme Court, for
which the editor was accused of trying to embarrass the court in the impar-
tial administration of justice.'33 Justice Holmes rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that truth should be a defense in contempt cases, saying truth was
irrelevant because both true and false statements could have the same ten-
dency to obstruct justice.'34 But in 1941, and again a few years later, the
Court rejected similar "contempt by publication" convictions as being in-
consistent with the First Amendment."'
The Court's new solicitude to free expression continued, with a few de-
tours,"' up to and beyond its most important twentieth century First Amend-
ment decision, New York Times v. Sullivan.137 In Sullivan, the Court had to
determine whether Alabama's libel law amounted to an unconstitutional
infringement on press freedom. 138 Justice William Brennan, writing for a
unanimous Court, said that Alabama's libel law, which held defendants li-
able if any statements in a defamatory publication were false, was unconsti-
tutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments when plaintiffs were
public officials. 139 Quoting extensively from Justice Brandeis in Whitney,
140
Justice Brennan wrote that the Alabama decision violated a long-settled
belief in an "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of politi-
cal and social changes desired by the people.'' Justice Brennan added that
130. United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 378, 388 (1925).
131. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
132. Id. at 462.
133. Id. at 459.
134. Id. at 462-63.
135. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
136. See, e.g., Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding criminal libel
conviction for distribution of racist fliers opposing integration in Chicago).
137. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
138. See id. at 256.
139. Id. at 264.
140. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
141. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (internal citation omitted).
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the case was decided in accordance with a "profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open," even if the debate included "caustic" attacks on the gov-
ernment and public officials. 4 2 In order to protect free debate, Justice Bren-
nan wrote, even erroneous statements of fact must be protected to give free-
dom of expression "breathing space."' 43
In Sullivan, the Court substantially changed much of the conventional
wisdom about the First Amendment. Sullivan was the first press case in
which the Court openly declared that the nation had a commitment to "unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open" debate about public officials and the gov-
ernment. The key value of the First Amendment, according to the Court,
was a Meiklejohn-like conception that all that needed to be said should be
allowed to be said, with the important addition that what was said did not
have to be 100% factually accurate as long as the errors were inadvertent. 44
The Court also explicitly, if somewhat belatedly, declared seditious libel
dead in the United States.
145
The Court's embrace of an expansive freedom of expression extended
beyond libel, particularly when the speech at issue had some political com-
ponent. After Sullivan, the Court found protection for speech actions that
many people would have found offensive, including the public display of a
jacket declaring "Fuck the Draft,"'146 the burning of an American flag, 147 and
the burning of a cross in a minority couple's yard. 48 But if the legacy of
Carolene Products was being felt, so was the legacy of Lovell. The Court
continued to find that the press was not to receive special treatment in busi-
ness matters, for better or worse. 14 9 It was, perhaps, inevitable that the lega-
cies would collide.
142. Id. at 270.
143. Id. at 271-72.
144. For a discussion of Meiklejohn's influence on the Supreme Court, see William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,
79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965).
145. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
146. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
147. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
148. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 396 (1992). But see Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (allowing the punishment of cross-burners if it could be proven that the
act was intended to intimidate others).
149. Compare Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (finding that the First
Amendment did not bar antitrust litigation against wire service) with Tex. Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (finding tax exemption for religious publications violates First
Amendment); Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (finding tax on
general-interest publications that exempted certain newspapers and other journals unconstitu-
tional); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)
(finding tax on paper and ink that affected only two newspapers unconstitutionally discrimi-
natory); cf Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (finding state tax on cable and satellite
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B. Limitations on the First Amendment Freedom
Only a year after Sullivan, the Supreme Court turned back a First
Amendment challenge to government travel restrictions in Zemel v. Rusk.15°
The Court concluded that the public's right to see conditions in Cuba first-
hand in order to make informed judgments about American foreign policy
did not overcome the government's interest in restricting travel to a hostile
nation: "The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unre-
strained right to gather information."'15' So, in language about as plain as the
Court ever employs, it made it clear that the right to a "robust, uninhibited,
and wide-open" exchange of viewpoints did not include a robust, uninhibi-
ted, and wide-open right to gather information that would inform those
viewpoints.
This delineation between what the First Amendment can and cannot do
has particularly clear implications for the institutional press, which is in the
business of gathering and disseminating news and opinion. The First
Amendment protects the dissemination, with a few restrictions,'52 along with
the right of every other person to express his or her views; it does not protect
the gathering process, except to the extent that all people have some as-yet
undefined right to know. But, in the four decades since Sullivan and Zemel,
this rather clear delineation of constitutional rights has not stopped the press
from claiming that it has newsgathering rights that eclipse those of the pub-
lic generally. Perhaps, as Thomas Emerson suggested, the press saw the
"general friendly attitude" of the Court toward free expression, demon-
strated in Sullivan, as an invitation to bring more controversial cases to the
justices. 53 If so, the press was soon disappointed.
The first signal that the press's attempts to expand its First Amendment
right to newsgathering would not succeed came in Branzburg v. Hayes,
154
but the signal was garbled. In Branzburg, the Court narrowly rejected a
claim that the press clause gave journalists a right to refuse to cooperate
with grand juries seeking the identities of confidential sources.'55 Picking up
on the theme from Lovell, the Court said that the press clause did not give
the institutional news media any rights not applicable to the general pub-
television services but not other media constitutional because the state did not intend to cen-
sor cable and satellite providers).
150. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
151. Id. at 17.
152. For example, it is still illegal to create, possess, or distribute obscene material. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973).
153. Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of the Press Under the Burger Court, in THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 1 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
154. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
155. See id. at 667.
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lic.' 56 Freedom of the press, the court said, applied as much to the "lonely
pamphleteer" as the metropolitan newspaper publisher.'57 Nothing in the
First Amendment gave reporters the right to refuse to honor the same duty
that all citizens shared to give relevant testimony to grand juries investigat-
ing crimes.5 However, at the same time, the Court suggested that news-
gathering was not without protection: "without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." '159 So far, the Court
has never clearly defined what "some" protection means, and Branzburg
was about as close as the press has come to having a constitutionally based
privilege not shared by the general public.
Since Branzburg, the Court has rejected press claims that reporters
should have access to federal and state prisons and inmates beyond the ac-
cess granted to the general public. 60 The Court also declined to give report-
ers a right of access to county jails. 16' Reporters were not immunized from
being questioned about the editorial process, including their doubts about
stories, during libel actions against them and their employers. 162 Just as re-
porters had to obey subpoenas to appear before grand juries, they also had to
accede to properly drafted and served search warrants. 63 Journalists also
were not immune from generally applicable tort laws just because their tor-
tious actions occurred during newsgathering.' 64 And, if law enforcement
officials took journalists with them while serving search warrants, the fact
that the people accompanying the police were there to gather news did not
immunize the police from lawsuits for violating suspects' Fourth Amend-
ment rights. 1
65
In 1978, First Amendment historian Margaret Blanchard noted that the
most consistent line of precedent in an otherwise inconsistent area of law
was that the press had no First Amendment rights that the general public did
not have. 66 Nothing since then has changed that interpretation. But, this is
not to say that the cases cited above were easy, and they certainly were not
unanimous. Justices in most of the cases raised serious questions in dissents
156. Id. at 683.
157. Id. at 704-05.
158. Id. at 686-88.
159. Id. at 681.
160. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974).
161. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
162. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
163. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
164. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
165. Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
166. Margaret A. Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First Amendment Privileges,
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 225.
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or concurrences about treating the news media exactly the same as everyone
else when it came to the First Amendment.
For example, in Branzburg, Justice William 0. Douglas argued that the
press needed an absolute privilege to protect source identities.'67 Justice
Douglas expressed fear that the government's power was becoming "more
and more pervasive" and that the government would use that power to "suf-
focate both people and causes."'6 8 The press, he said, had a "preferred posi-
tion" in the Constitution in order to "bring fulfillment to the public's right to
know."' 69 Similarly, in Pell v. Procunier,170 a prison access case, Justice
Douglas argued that denying the media access to prisons and inmates be-
yond the access afforded the general public would deny the public its right
to know.' 7' Few people could be expected to visit prisons on their own to
examine conditions, he said, so they relied on the news media to tell them
what was going on behind prison walls.
72
In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 73 another prison access case, Justice
Lewis Powell argued, as Justice Douglas had done in Pell, that it was "hope-
lessly unrealistic" to expect the public to become personally familiar with
newsworthy events.'74 In his dissent from an opinion that upheld the right of
federal prison officials to deny the media access to prisoners for interviews,
Justice Powell said that the press acted as "an agent of the public" in cover-
ing newsworthy events.'7 5 Justice Powell went on to suggest that prison ad-
ministrators could create a more flexible policy that would serve the infor-
mation needs of the media and public, while maintaining control of the
prison population.'76
In another jail access case, Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the ma-
jority opinion in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 77 which upheld a county jail's
right to impose the same access restrictions on the media as on the public,
including a ban on interviews and the use of cameras and tape recorders.'
But, Justice Stewart suggested that the television station was entitled to
some relief. 79 Justice Stewart said that he did not believe that "equal" access
167. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 724.
169. Id. at 721.
170. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
171. Id. at 839-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 841.
173. 417 U.S. 843.
174. Id. at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 873-74.
177. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
178. See id. at 15-16.
179. Id. at 16.
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for both the media and the public had to mean "identical" access.8 0 He said
that equal access should be defined so as to consider the practical distinc-
tions between the media and the public. 8 ' If the media were not allowed to
use cameras and tape recorders in the jail, he said, they could not convey the
jail's sights and sounds to the public.'82 Therefore, restrictions that might be
reasonable for the public would not be as reasonable for the media, he
wrote.1
8 3
But, these were dissents and concurrences, not majority opinions.
While some Supreme Court justices apparently believed that the press
needed special protection in at least some circumstances, this viewpoint
never captured a majority of the Court.
C. Hope After Branzburg
This is not to say that things were completely bleak for the press after
Branzburg. A series of cases, starting in 1980 with Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia,'84 established a First Amendment right for the press and public to
attend criminal trials and other court proceedings. 85 In Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo,8 6 the Court struck down a Florida law that required
newspapers to carry replies from political candidates that the newspapers
had criticized editorially.'87 The Court said the law constituted a prior re-
straint because newspapers had finite space to fill, so requiring a newspaper
to carry material its editors and owners preferred not to carry would require
them to leave out material the paper would otherwise publish.'
The Tornillo decision is interesting beyond the Court's rather tortured
effort to find a "no-prior-restraint" justification for its decision to strike
down the law. Much of the unanimous opinion is taken up with a reply to an
amicus brief from law professor Jerome Barron, who argued that the Court
should uphold the Florida law because it facilitated access to the media for
the public, and therefore improved the conditions for free expression. 89 Al-
though Chief Justice Warren Burger conceded that the press was often un-
fair and inaccurate, he ultimately rejected the idea that the First Amendment
required the government to improve the conditions for free expression by
180. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 17.
183. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 17.
184. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
185. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super.
Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
186. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
187. Id. at 258.
188. Id. at 256-57.
189. Id. at 247-56.
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affirmative acts or, as he put it, "that the First Amendment acts as a sword as
wellas a shield." 90
One may be forgiven at the end of the day for feeling that First
Amendment jurisprudence is incomplete. The speech and press clauses of
the First Amendment protect a broad right to free expression, according to
the Supreme Court. But, the expression clauses do not protect "an unre-
strained right to gather information."'19' The First Amendment is a shield, not
a sword,' 92 which protects from the government our right to speak and pub-
lish, but it does not require the government to act affirmatively to improve
the conditions for expression. Various Founders and theorists, and even a
few Supreme Court justices, have noted that the institutional press is par-
ticularly useful in spreading news about government and in acting as a
check on abuses of government power, but the press has no rights beyond
those of the public, except for "some"'' 93 vague protection for newsgather-
ing. If this situation seems to us to be at odds with founding principles, what
can we do to correct the problem?
V. THE LIMITS OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
To borrow an analogy from the world of music, First Amendment ju-
risprudence up to now is a lot like telling someone that she can play a piano
concerto but cannot consult the sheet music. Like the pianist in the analogy,
we are free to make all of the noise we want, but we have no constitutional
right to gather the information that would result in a more informed, pol-
ished performance.
A. The Supreme Court's View of the First Amendment
Certainly, one could argue that the Supreme Court's vision of the
speech and press clauses is impoverished-if one believes that the Court
even has a vision regarding free expression. Vincent Blasi makes a strong
case for the idea that the Framers envisioned free expression as a tool the
public could use to check the abuses of the government. 194 In order to play
its significant role in that task, Blasi argued, the press needed to have a
strong privilege to protect the identities of confidential sources within the
government. 95 On a broader scale, Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman
borrows a phrase from intellectual property law to suggest that the Framers
190. Id. at 251.
191. Zemel v. Rush, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
192. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 251.
193. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
194. Blasi, supra note 22.
195. Id. at 606-07; see supra text accompanying note 107.
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intended for there to be a rich public domain.'96 Zimmerman's point is that
the Framers put a limit-a vague one, to be sure-on Congress's power to
guarantee intellectual property rights to creators197 so that information would
be widely and freely available to the public.198 As Zimmerman put it, "[t]o
exercise the right of free speech, one must necessarily enjoy some consider-
able right to have something to say."1 99
But before we curse the Framers for not saying what they meant more
clearly or the Supreme Court for what Justice Stewart once called its
"crabbed view" of the First Amendment,20 ° we need to confront the fact that
there are good reasons why the Court has declined to protect the process of
information or news gathering. First, concluding that the First Amendment
gives people a constitutional right to gather information would lead to the
inevitable problem of determining how much information has to be made
available. Line-drawing with a right is harder than line-drawing with a piece
of legislation or even the common law. As Professor David Anderson has
said, many of the questions that arise in regard to giving the press preferen-
tial treatment cannot be answered by constitutional principle.20 , The ques-
tions raise issues of degree and prudence about which reasonable people can
disagree, and the Constitution should not be used "to enshrine one set of
reasonable intuitions over another that is equally reasonable. 2 2 So, for ex-
ample, there is probably some government-held information that should
remain secret, although perhaps not as much as the government would
claim.
2 3
Justice Stewart's admonition that the Constitution set up the contest be-
tween the press and the government but not its outcome204 may simply mean
that there has to be room for give and take. The government may be less
forthcoming in times of war or terrorist threat but more open in times of
peace. This give and take is possible when access to government-held in-
formation and the press's ability to shield sources are protected by strong
public policy, backed by statutes, or perhaps common law, but less so when
we enter the realm of constitutional rights.
Second, we need to confront certain problems with granting special
rights to the press, which is the institution most obviously affected by limits
196. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View
of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 297 (2004).
197. UNITED STATES CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
198. Zimmerman, supra note 196, at 315.
199. Id. at 329.
200. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
201. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. L. REv. 429, 515 (2002).
202. Id.
203. See Scott Shane, Since 2001, Sharp Increase in the Number of Documents Classified
by the Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A14.
204. Stewart, supra note 98, at 636.
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on information gathering. Despite rhetoric by Justice Stewart, Vincent Blasi,
and others about a "Fourth Estate" or fourth branch of government embod-
ied in the press and/or public, 205 the truth is that there is a big difference
between the press and the three official branches. No one elects the media.
Of course, no one elects the federal judiciary, either, but citizens elect the
people who choose the judges.2 °6 Certainly, the political process is not per-
fect, but it is constitutionally sanctioned in relatively clear language, as op-
posed to the First Amendment's vague press protection.
Justice Byron White made this point in Branzburg, noting that it was
not unusual for the police, like the press, to use confidential sources or in-
formants. °7 Justice White said that the difference was that the police system
of informants was controlled, indirectly, by the public, which elects the peo-
ple who make policies, hire officers and their supervisors, and pay officers'
salaries.2 8 Justice White said the Court was reluctant to put a similar system
in the hands of a press that would be unregulated and uncontrolled by the
public.209 Along similar lines, Chief Justice Burger in the Houchins decision
failed to see how guaranteeing the press a constitutional right to enter a
county jail to view conditions would benefit the public.1 ° If jail conditions
needed improvement, the Chief Justice said, there already were elected pub-
lic officials who could determine that and act to improve conditions, without
the press getting involved.2 '
It would be easy to counter Justice White and Chief Justice Burger
from a public policy standpoint-who is watching the police, the jail, and
those who supervise them to make sure the public's will is done?-but it is
harder from a constitutional standpoint. The federal and state constitutions
do not give the press governing power, although the guarantees of press
freedom may give the press some oversight authority.
There is also a fairness question. Chief Justice Burger noted in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti2 2 that news organizations are usually
parts of corporations. 13 In joining with the Court's decision to recognize
non-media corporations' First Amendment right to participate in political
dialogue, Chief Justice Burger expressed concern about what the opposite
outcome might have meant for the press. If the Court had determined that
corporations had no free-speech rights, he said, how could the Court then
205. Id.; Blasi, supra note 22, at 527-28.
206. UNITED STATES CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
207. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697-98 (1972).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1978).
211. Id. at 14.
212. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
213. Id. at 796.
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justify protecting the expressive rights of the institutional media? 214 Under
what neutral principle could the Court find that the press, organized in a
corporate form, could continue to express its views, but other corporations
could not?1 5 Again, one could make a public policy argument that The New
York Times is different than, say, General Motors, but it is much more diffi-
cult to make the constitutional argument, absent clear guidance from the
Framers that they even contemplated a corporate press.
A similar caution can be derived from Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.1 6 Forcing the press to
provide the public access to its pages would require, in the Court's view,
some sort of governmental attempt to regulate the marketplace of ideas to
make it more effective.217 While such a regulatory scheme has existed with
regard to broadcasting,2tt that system is based upon the understanding that
the public owns the airwaves. To place similar restraints on other media
would raise problems of government interference on a disturbing scale. The
wisdom of the Tornillo decision is more obvious in hindsight, given the
Rehnquist Court's willingness to let government make the rules when it
controls the speech arena.2l9 The inevitable collision between the First
Amendment and the government's right to control its own message would
be messy if the government took on the role of press facilitator.
Still, in the end, we are left with the feeling that the First Amendment
could do more to aid the press and public than the role the Supreme Court
has allowed. First Amendment scholar Frederick Schauer recently made the
point that a Supreme Court that does not recognize institutional differences
in speakers is likely to set the free-expression bar low so that all can cross
over it, rather than setting it at various heights for different classes ofspeak-
ers.22° But, his call for a more nuanced First Amendment jurisprudence ap-
pears unlikely to get very far absent a major shift in direction on the Court.
Another reason the Court is unlikely to suddenly change gears in re-
gard to press freedom is that there appears to be no good reason for it to do
so yet. In 1972, Justice White noted in his Branzburg majority opinion that
the press had never enjoyed a First Amendment or common law testimonial
privilege of the kind sought by the media parties, and yet, the press had
214. Id. at 797 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
215. Id. at 799.
216. 418 U.S. 241; see also supra text accompanying notes 186-90.
217. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 418 U.S. at 258.
218. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding Federal Commu-
nications Commission rule that broadcasters must give airtime to people attacked on the air).
219. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct.
1297 (2006); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).




flourished.22' Whether "flourished" is too strong a word is a matter of opin-
ion, but certainly Justice White was at least close to the truth.
B. Limited Protection for Journalists
Information gathering and access by the public and newsgathering by
the press are not without protection and privilege, even without much help
from the Constitution. For example, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), passed by Congress in 1966, despite its limitations,222 generally
gives the press and public broad access to government documents. 223 The
press is protected from search warrants by another act of Congress, the Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1980.224 Despite the holding in Cohen v. Cowles Me-
dia Co.,225 which stated that the First Amendment does not shield the press
from tort actions for newsgathering acts, federal appellate courts have fash-
ioned limited and sporadic common law protections when the tortious
newsgathering uncovered news of public concern.226 Courts have not
flinched when they have noted that government agencies and bureaus often
give the press special identification that allows journalists special access to
places or that special access has developed through "custom and usage. 227
In fact, the journalist's evidentiary privilege is a bit of an anomaly be-
cause it has survived as a constitutional issue despite (or because of)
Branzburg and despite Branzburg's progeny in regard to newsgathering
privileges. 22 Many lower federal courts interpreted Branzburg as endorsing
a constitutional journalist's privilege in situations other than grand jury in-
vestigations, thanks to a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis Powell.229 Jus-
tice Powell sided with the majority in denying a First Amendment privilege
but also emphasized that the decision was limited to a particular fact pat-
tern.23° Since 1972, most federal appellate courts have agreed that there is a
221. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 699 (1972).
222. See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004); Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
223. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
224. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006).
225. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
226. See, e.g., Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999); Desnick v.
ABC, 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
227. Fletcher v. Fla. Publ'g Co., 319 So. 2d 100, 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (noting
trial court finding that it was customary for police and firefighters to allow media representa-
tives onto private property during fires).
228. See supra cases cited in notes 160-65 and accompanying text.




qualified privilege protecting at least confidential information held by jour-
nalists or people doing work similar to journalism.23'
At the state level, Connecticut, barring a governor's veto, was poised at
this writing to become the thirty-first state with a "shield law," a form of
statutory protection for journalists.232 New Mexico accomplishes the same
thing with a statewide court rule, 233 and the District of Columbia has a simi-
lar law.234 In the states without shield laws, most have recognized some form
of common law or constitutional protection for journalists.235 There is even a
231. See, e.g., Price v. Time, 416 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 425 F.3d
1292 (11 th Cir. 2005); Donohue v. Hoey, 109 F. App'x 3401 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
544 U.S. 921 (2005); Ashcraft v. Conoco, 218 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2000); Gonzales v. NBC,
194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256 (7th Cir. 1995); Zerilli v.
Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.
1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Bursey v. United
States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972); Cervantes v. Times, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
But see McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (2003) (questioning decisions of other circuits to
recognize privilege in light of Branzburg); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th
Cir. 1987) (rejecting existence of any journalist's privilege in federal law in wake of
Branzburg).
232. See Connecticut H.B. 5212, available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/FC/2006HB-
05212-R000566-FC.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006); see also ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (Mi-
chie 1995 & Supp. 2004); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300-90 (2004); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-2237 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (Michie 1987 & Supp.
2003); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995 & Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-
119 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (Michie Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.5015 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (Michie 1995 & Supp.
2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/8-901-09 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 34-46-4-1-2 (Lexis 1998 & Supp. 2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie 1992 &
Supp. 2004); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. arts. 1451-59 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & Jun. PRO. § 9-112 (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
767.5a (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); MrNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-25 (West 2000 & Supp.
2005); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901-03 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-144-47 (Lexis
1999 & Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21-21.13 (West 1994 & Supp. 2005); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h
(West 1992 & Supp. 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-53.11 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2739.04-12 (Anderson 2000 & Supp. 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West Supp.
2005); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.510-40 (2003 & Supp. 2004); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5942 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1-3 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2005);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (Supp. 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (Lexis 2000 &
Supp. 2004).
233. N.M. RULESANN. § 11-514 (2005).
234. D.C. CODEANN. §§ 16-4701-04 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004).
235. See In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985); Waterloo/Cedar Falls
Courier v. Hawkeye Comty. Coll., 646 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 2002); State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d
812 (Kan. 1978); In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1991);
State ex rel. Classic III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Siel, 444
A.2d 499 (N.H. 1982); Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broad. Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D.
1995); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429
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Department of Justice (DOJ) policy that is designed to curtail the DOJ's
power to subpoena members of the news media.236 So, the journalist's privi-
lege stands out as the only press favor that is recognized as a constitutional,
common law, statutory, and administrative privilege.
Why has the testimonial and evidentiary privilege gone where no other
press privilege has? Perhaps because it is so elemental. It is one thing to say
that there is no "unrestrained" right to gather news237 or that the First
Amendment is not a freedom of information act.23' Even if the government
will not let you travel to Cuba or have access to information it holds, people
who have been to Cuba or seen the information can still tell you about it. To
return to our musical analogy, being told you do not have a constitutional
right to peruse the sheet music before playing the concerto does not mean
you are forbidden to play. It simply means that you will have to view the
sheet music of someone who does have access, or you will have to learn to
play by listening to someone who has seen the notes on the pages. But, if
you are blocked from talking to those people, your situation is much
bleaker.
This, in essence, is what Justice Stewart feared would happen in the
wake of Branzburg. In his dissent, he argued that the majority was interfer-
ing with a necessary component of modem journalism:
The right to gather news implies ... a right to a confidential relationship
between a reporter and his source. This proposition follows as a matter
of simple logic once three factual predicates are recognized: (1) news-
men require informants to gather news; (2) confidentiality-the promise
or understanding that names or certain aspects of communications will
be kept off the record-is essential to the creation and maintenance of a
news-gathering relationship with informants; and (3) an unbridled sub-
poena power-the absence of a constitutional right protecting, in any
way, a confidential relationship from compulsory process-will either
deter sources from divulging information or deter reporters from gather-
ing and publishing information.
239
In short, Justice Stewart's argument is that in order to create expres-
sion, journalists must have sources, and sometimes those sources must be
confidential. If those sources do not come forward out of fear of exposure,
news will be stopped. The same will happen if journalists fearful of subpoe-
(Va. 1974); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); Ze-
lenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978).
236. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2003).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 150-5 1.
238. See supra text accompanying note 102.
239. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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nas avoid publishing certain stories. Expression, which everyone agrees is
protected, is therefore stopped by a limitation on newsgathering.
Justice Stewart's argument seems logical, which is perhaps why so
many courts have adopted some form of constitutional privilege. But in re-
cent years, the underpinnings of the federal version of the privilege have
weakened, as judges have begun to question the privilege's constitutional
basis.
C. Federal Courts Weaken the Journalist's Privilege
McKevitt v. Pallasch240 is a prime example of this questioning process.
Judge Posner's opinion expressed surprise at other courts' findings that
Branzburg endorsed, or at least allowed room for, a First Amendment-based
journalist's privilege.24" ' Judge Posner found some federal courts' decisions
to be "audacious" or "skating on thin ice, 242 particularly those that recog-
nized a privilege protecting journalists' work product, such as nonconfiden-
tial notes, outtakes, or unpublished photographs. 243 The judge said that he
saw no reason to protect journalists beyond the protections available to all
citizens called to testify or provide other evidence against unreasonable or
irrelevant subpoenas.2"
The period since McKevitt in 2003 has not been uniformly bad for
journalists claiming a privilege,245 but the most high-profile federal cases
have cast serious doubt on the privilege's continued existence. Rhode Island
television reporter Jim Taricani was sentenced to six months of home con-
finement for defying a judge's order to identify his source for a surveillance
tape his station aired in regard to a public corruption probe.246 New York
240. 339 F.3d 530; see also supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
241. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532-33.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 533.
245. See, e.g., Price v. Time, 416 F.3d 1327 (11 th Cir. 2005) (finding that magazine re-
porter, a defendant in a libel suit, could not claim protection of his sources under the Alabama
shield law but could protect a confidential source under a First Amendment privilege);
Donohue v. Hoey, 109 F. App'x 340 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (finding that incomplete record indi-
cated district court did not abuse its discretion in quashing subpoenas for reporters in connec-
tion with civil suit); Gray v. St. Martin's Press, Inc., 221 F.3d 243 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding
that the district court's decision to quash a subpoena for the defendant author's confidential
source in a libel case was not an error given that the jury found for the defendant on grounds
unrelated to the identity of the source).
246. In re Special Proceedings, C.A. No. 01-47 (D.R.I. Dec. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/opinions/torres/2004/unpublished/12092004_1-O1MSCO047T_
sentencing.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). Taricani was released from his sentence in April




Times reporter Judith Miller served eighty-five days in jail for refusing to
cooperate with a grand jury probe into whether a government official leaked
information to her and other reporters about a Central Intelligence Agency
operative's marriage to a Bush administration critic.24 7 Five of six reporters
found in contempt for refusing to identify sources to Wen Ho Lee, a former
Los Alamos nuclear scientist suing the government for releasing information
about him to the press during an investigation into whether he passed secrets
to China, lost in their attempts to quash the subpoenas. 248 Four of the report-
ers appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari
after the government and the reporters' employers settled out of court with
Lee.249 A fifth reporter subpoenaed by Lee did not appeal a District Court
decision, 250 while the sixth won on the grounds that he had no information to
impart. Meanwhile, two reporters for the San Francisco Chronicle were
ordered to identify the person or persons who leaked grand jury testimony to
them regarding steroid use in baseball.2 Members of Congress are calling
for investigations into leaks of information to the media about secret CIA
prisons for terrorists overseas253 and secret government eavesdropping on
United States citizens.2 14 Those investigations may eventually lead to sub-
poenas to the media. Also, a civil suit by Stephen Hatfill that is similar to
Wen Ho Lee's may eventually ensnare the media. Hatfill is seeking dam-
ages for government leaks to the press about his alleged involvement, un-
proved so far, in the mailing of anthrax to various persons after September
11,2001.255
247. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh'g en banc
denied, 405 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
248. Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh'g en banc denied, 428
F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
249. Thomas v. Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2373 (2006); Drogin v. Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2341 (2006);
Adam Liptak, News Media Pay in Scientist Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2006, at Al.
250. Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005).
251. Lee, 413 F.3d at 64 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence that reporter Jeff
Gerth of the New York Times knew the identities of confidential sources).
252. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
253. See David Johnston & Carl Hulse, C.I.A. Asks Criminal Inquiry over Secret-Prison
Article, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A18; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret
Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al.
254. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets United States Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; Scott Shane, Criminal Inquiry Opens into Leak in
Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at Al; see also JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE
SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006) (book based on same
reporting as newspaper story).
255. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Special Report: Reporters and Fed-
eral Subpoenas: Hatfill v. Ashcrofl, available at http://www.rcfp.org/shields and_
subpoenas.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
[Vol. 29
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
D. Options for Finding Protection
If First Amendment protection for press attempts to shield sources is
wavering, could the press find protection through a common law privilege?
Certainly, one could argue that the Supreme Court's recognition of a com-
mon law privilege for psychotherapists in 1996's Jaffee v. Redmond5 6 offers
hope to journalists. The decision hinged in large part on the fact that all fifty
states recognized some sort of psychotherapist privilege through common
law or statute.257 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, adopted three years
after Branzburg, federal courts are encouraged to consult common law in
determining the efficacy of evidentiary privileges. 8 The widespread recog-
nition of the journalist's privilege in the states is similar.
But, journalists face a problem in arguing that Jaffee forms a basis for
Supreme Court recognition of a similar privilege for the press. Psychothera-
pists are licensed by states, but anyone can claim to be a journalist. The
problem of defining a class of persons entitled to the journalist's privilege
was noted by one of the appellate judges in the Judith Miller case and the
district judge in one of the Wen Ho Lee cases in rejecting the existence of a
common law privilege. District of Columbia appellate judge David Sentelle
argued that Branzburg not only rejected a constitutional privilege but a
common law privilege as well. 9 Judge Sentelle questioned how the court
could recognize such a privilege when it was becoming increasingly diffi-
cult, in the Internet age, to limit the class of persons who practiced journal-
ism.
260
District Judge Rosemary M. Collyer, in rejecting Washington Post re-
porter Walter Pincus's attempt to quash a subpoena in the Lee case, argued
that Jaffee would not favor a ruling for Pincus on the question of whether a
common law journalist's privilege existed.261 The judge noted that the Su-
preme Court in Jaffee concluded that the confidential relationship between
psychotherapists and patients was central to encouraging the frankness that
went to the heart of successful therapy and, therefore, served a "public good
of transcendent importance.2 62 But, the judge said keeping a source's iden-
tity confidential was only a useful tool for a journalist, not a right of "tran-
256. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
257. Id. at 13-15.
258. FED. R. EVID. 501. For a discussion of the history of Rule 501's adoption, see Ed-
ward J. Imwinkelreid, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal Rule of Evidence
501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB.
L. REv. 511 (1994).
259. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d at 977 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
260. Id.
261. Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123, 141 (D.D.C. 2005).
262. Id. (quoting Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11).
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scendent importance., 263 Therefore, she concluded that Jaffee was not analo-
gous to Pincus's situation. 6
Like Judge Sentelle, Judge Collyer was also troubled by the problem of
determining who would be able to claim protection under a common law
journalist's privilege. "The proliferation of communications media in the
modem world makes it impossible [to define] reporter," she wrote.265 Re-
porters, she noted, do not have special courses of study, are not licensed, and
are not subject to organized oversight or discipline. 266 They are not, in other
words, anything like the psychotherapists in Jaffee.267
With the First Amendment basis for the privilege wavering and doubts
arising about the common law privilege, the most promising avenue for re-
porters may be a statutory privilege. Several versions of a proposed shield
law have been introduced in Congress during its 2005-2006 session, but
none have come to a vote.268 The most recent version, introduced by Senator
Richard Lugar of Indiana, who was also the prime sponsor of two earlier
versions, would provide qualified protection to confidential sources and no
protection to nonconfidential information, making it weaker than the earlier
269 av
versions. Media advocates said that the bill was the best that journalists
would likely get under the current Congress.27" Even in weakened form, a
federal shield law would at least end uncertainty in federal law about jour-
nalists' rights to protect the identities of sources.
Also, as Professor William Lee has noted, the legislative branch is the
only branch of government that can legitimately make distinctions between
various persons when granting privileges, as long as it does not do so for
impermissible, content-based reasons.27 ' There are good arguments against
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 140.
266. Id.
267. Lee, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 140.
268. Free Flow of Information Act, S. 2831, 109th Cong. (2006) (would provide qualified
protection for confidential sources); Free Speech Protection Act, S. 369, 109th Cong. (2005)
(would create an absolute privilege for confidential information and qualified privilege for
nonconfidential information for persons who gathered information with intent to disseminate
it to the public); Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 581, 109th Cong. (2005) (similar, except
narrower definition of covered persons); S. 340 (identical to H.R. 581); Free Flow of Infor-
mation Act, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005) (would create absolute protection for confidential
information sought by executive and judicial branches except in cases of national security
and qualified privilege for nonconfidential information); Free Flow of Information Act, H.R.
3323, 109th Cong. (2005) (identical to S. 1419).
269. Free Flow of Information Act, S. 2831, 109th Cong. (2006).
270. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Shield Bill Introduced in Senate, avail-
able at http://www.rcfp.org/2006/0518-con-shield.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
271. William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist's Privilege, 23
CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 635,676-77 (2006).
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the press asking for favors from Congress, including the awkwardness of
journalists becoming beholden to people they cover. But given the difficul-
ties of persuading courts to grant constitutional or common law privileges
that single out the press for protection, legislation may be the only viable
option.
VI. CONCLUSION
As early as 1774, the people who won this country's independence
from Great Britain and formed its government expressed faith in the power
of the press to distribute civic information to the public and hold public offi-
cials accountable to those they govern. This fundamental belief in the power
of free expression has animated theorists dating back as far as John Milton
in 1644. It has formed the basis for the Supreme Court's findings in favor of
free expression for most of the twentieth century and beyond.
But, finding that all citizens, including members of the press, have a
broadly defined right to expression has not guaranteed either the press or the
public a right of access to information or a right to gather news without im-
pediment. There are compelling philosophical and practical arguments both
for and against a right to gather news. However, the bottom line is that the
Supreme Court, the final arbiter of constitutional issues, has been highly
reluctant to extend constitutional protection to information gathering or ex-
traordinary rights to the press, the institution most affected by any potential
limits on information gathering. There is no good reason to believe that this
will change, absent a somewhat improbable Court decision favoring a com-
mon law privilege.
However, the historical and philosophical arguments in favor of press
protection could be marshaled by the press in an attempt to win support
from the legislative branch. In regard to the journalist's privilege, this ap-
proach already has worked in a majority of the states and appears to be gain-
ing favor in Congress. While it is not a perfect solution, a statutory privilege
would alleviate uncertainty in the law and provide at least some measure of
protection against increasing government interference in journalist-source
relationships. The political process is not pretty, but it is the same system
that a free press is supposed to help inform the public about and watch for
abuses. Why should the press-and the public it is supposed to inform-not
benefit from it?
When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830s, he
noted that nearly every association, political or otherwise, of any size soon
created a newspaper to keep its members apprised of its goals and achieve-
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ments.272 Tocqueville wrote that "if there were no newspapers, there would
be no common activity," and thus, no democracy. 2 Tocqueville's observa-
tion that a newspaper was necessary to maintain a self-governing democracy
in a large, decentralized country is even more true of the United States 170
years later-although now we could add radio stations, television stations,
and the Internet to the mix. If our collective musical work is the continuing
hum of democracy, we must work to protect those who provide the notes.
272. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 202 (Richard D. Heffner ed.,
1984) (1835).
273. Id.
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